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I. Introduction 
The rationing of private market loans. to small businesses, 
with emphasis on firms located in non-metropolitan areas, is the 
subject of this monograph. Although the frequency of credit 
rationing is not known, a number of obstacles could prevent one 
small-business proposal from winning a loan under terms similar 
to the terms available to comparable projects. In the presence 
of credit rationing, some form of public action may be appropri-
ate if all comparable business proposals are going to be funded. 
No agreement exists, however, on the best policy to deal with 
capital market obstacles. Direct market intervention in the form 
of public loans or loan assistance programs is used by federal, 
state, and many local units of government. Alternatively, some 
analysts believe that stimulation of private sector lending 
through national policy regulating financial institutions is a 
better approach; still others question whether any policy can 
actually improve on private capital markets. 
Obstacles to gaining private credit can arise from the costs 
of loan transactions, borne by banks and other commercial 
lenders; from the structure of the lending market; and from 
benefits generated by the project for which the business will not 
receive payment. Further, the theoretical argument and limited 
evidence in this paper point to small differences in credit 
availability for projects in metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
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areas. While small, these differences nonetheless may be tied to 
specific difficulties in obtaining credit; much research remains 
to be done to discover the significance for firms trying to 
access credit in certain locations. 
In the presence of credit obstacles, two otherwise identical 
business loan proposals can receive different treatment by banks 
and other commercial lenders. The project of _one firm can be 
funded while the other project experiences credit rationing, 
i.e., the firm either is denied funding or faces more stringent 
stipulations on the conditions of the loan contract. These 
conditions include the loan amount, term of loan, repayment 
schedule, interest rate structure, and collateral requirements. 
The interest rate is the price of a loan contract. In the 
market for other goods and services, a willing buyer usually can 
get the product simply by offering a high enough price. This is 
not true for loans; offers by the borrower to pay higher interest 
do not necessarily guarantee that the loan.is forthcoming. 
Granting of the loan also is contingent on the collateral 
available, the riskiness of the project, and the perceived 
ability of the borrower to make timely payments on a schedule 
suited to the project. _with inadequate collateral or high risk 
or a bad payment plan, the offer of high interest will not secure 
a loan. 
When the market for business credit works perfectly, then, 
if any projects are funded by private lenders, all comparable 
projects also are funded. In the perfect market, borrowers and 
4 
lenders have complete information and act as if the interest rate 
is beyond their control. And, given the designated size, term, 
repayment schedule, and collateral, there is no excess supply of 
or demand for credit. A perfectly functioning credit market 
provides desirable benefits. In the short-run, credit is 
allocated so that more productive projects get priority in 
funding. In the long-run, the going interest rate tends to be 
the lowest possible sustainable interest rate for comparable 
investments. All projects that will make repayment according to 
the loan conditions are funded in the long-run if the market is 
perfect. 
When a market fails to function perfectly then society loses 
some benefits. Better projects can be assigned lower priority 
for funding and some good projects may never be funded. As a 
result, some business expansions or new business starts do not 
occur and society loses potential income and employment. 
Credit markets typically function well yet are not perfect. 
The imperfections are particularly significant for small busi-
nesses because they have less access to equity financing and 
because non-traditional sources of credit, such as insurance 
companies, tend to lend to larger firms. Thus some credit-worthy 
small businesses either do not have access to credit or cannot 
get credit under the same conditions as other comparable bor-
rowers. 
Section II below discusses the impact of the costs of 
lending on the availability of credit. The structure of the 
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credit market is the subject of section III. The fourth section 
deals with the significance for credit markets when borrowers 
provide uncompensated, external benefits to other parties. And 
the final section draws on all earlier parts of the study to 
argue that non-metropolitan areas, especially those experiencing 
economic decline, may be more severely credit,rationed than areas 
with growing local economies. 
II. The Costs of Making a Loan 
A loan transaction is costly to the lender in several ways. 
There are direct costs associated with acquiring information 
about the application_and administering the loan, as well as the 
potential costs arising from default. These costs can be reduced 
1) by screening-out groups of borrowers suspected to pose high 
risk, rather than evaluating individual projects and 2) by 
requiring collateral as a condition for granting the loan. Both 
screening and the use of collateral result in excluding some 
credit-worthy projects from funding. Both techniques possibly 
affect non-metropolitan borrowers more strongly than their 
metropolitan counterparts. 
A business loan also can be costly in comparison to other 
opportunities available to the bank. Banks have many choices for 
the placement of their funds, including consumer loans, agricul-
tural loans, foreign loans, and purchases of U.S. government 
securities among other options. The return to each depends on 
the cost of the making the loan and the risk, as well as on the 
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interest rate earned. If any of these other opportunities brings 
a better net return, then the business loan is comparatively 
costly. -In practice the rate of return on government securities 
may determine the desirability of other options; if a commercial 
loan cannot net an equal or greater return, then government 
securities are a better choice. In times of high public demand 
for credit, some business borrowers in any location may be out-
bid by the government for available credit. 
Information is a key element in all loan transactions. The 
direct costs of a loan transaction arise mainly because informa-
tion is not free. Yet, with more information about potential 
borrowers, lenders can reduce costs brought on by default. 
Lenders face a trade-off between the costs and benefits of 
investing in more information. 
Lenders would like to know all relevant details about the 
borrower's character and project; about the future of the 
economy, especially regarding the borrower's industry and 
location; about the future marketability of collateral; and about 
other current and future investment opportunities. Because 
information is always less than complete, credit decisions always 
involve a degree of uncertainty and are inherently risky. 
Screening and collateral are two approaches commonly used by 
lenders to reduce risk and information costs. 
Screening 
To avoid the cost of processing applications, lenders can 
screen-out certain groups of potential borrowers by simply 
7 
declining to review their applications. Screening eliminates 
many unqualified applicants at no direct cost to the lender. 
However, some individual applicants from the excluded groups may 
be qualified; they are excluded too. 
Borrowers of small amounts may be screened-out, making small 
businesses especially vulnerable to credit supply problems. The 
relatively high cost of evaluating commercial loan applications 
is not justified by many proposals for small loans.(1) 
New customers or customers from outside the banking neigh-
borhood may be screened, because the bank does not already have 
working experience with the business and a background of knowle-
dge of the character and management skill of owners. Also, the 
bank may not be informed about the economy in the area where the 
business is located.(2) Screening of new, outside customers 
could particularly affect small, non-metropolitan businesses 
seeking credit from metropolitan banks. 
Borrowers can be excluded if they represent an industry 
unfamiliar to bank officials, especially if this is a new-product 
industry with little history of responsible credit management. 
Applicants from an industry known to have frequent defaults may 
be refused, as may service or retail firms that have few marketa-
ble assets.(3) Banks may not consider applications from in-
dividual business owners with a prior history of default. 
Screening-out these applicants helps avoid borrowers of ques-
tionable character and acts as leverage to persuade current 
borrowers not to default.(4) And, representatives of minority 
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groups and women business owners claim that their applicants are 
turned-away more frequently than other business owners.(5) 
Collateral 
When a potential borrower from any of the categories above 
offers sufficient collateral, the application is less likely to 
be screened out and more likely to be considered. Because 
screening is a blunt tool for cutting away unfundable proposals, 
it also lops off some good proposals that lenders would fund if 
information about the borrower were less costly. One of the 
functions of collateral is to provide low cost information to 
banks and other commercial lenders. 
Credit-rationing can occur when the quantity or quality of 
the collateral offered by the firm does not provide the correct 
information to the lender. The causes of this credit rationing 
fall into 3 categories: 
1) divergence in borrower and lender valuation of col-
lateral; 
2) differences in valuation of collateral among borrowers; 
and 
3) differences of variance in the value of collateral 
assets. 
The third category potentially affects projects in non-
metropolitan areas more strongly than those in metropolitan 
locations. 
Collateral consists primarily of tangible assets either 
owned at the outset or acquired in the course of the loan project 
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by the borrowing firm. Real estate and machinery are frequently 
pledged as collateral; the lender has first claim on the value of 
these assets if the borrower defaults on the loan. And, because 
default means that borrowers forfeit these valuable assets, their 
use as collateral will reduce the probability of default. 
Intangible assets like bonds can also be put up as collateral. 
Even non-traded assets like the borrower's character or good 
credit-rating can be thought of as collateral. Non-traded assets 
have no salvage value if default occurs, but they do increase the 
likelihood that the loan is repaid, even if the business fails. 
An offer of high quality collateral indicates the firm is 
not likely to default on the loan contract and, even if default 
does occur, the bank's assets will be recovered. The offer can 
result either in a loan being granted when otherwise it might not 
be or in the offer of a larger loan at a lower interest rate than 
is otherwise possible.(6) 
The availability of collateral, however, is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for a loan to be granted. 
For some borrowers collateral is not required. These firms are 
able to negotiate loan commitment contracts for which they pay a 
front-end fee. Loan contracts of this type guarantee credit to 
the firm on demand at any time during the contract period with no 
collateral requirement. For other borrowers, those unknown to 
the lender or uncertain credit risks, not even the offer of 
unusual amounts of collateral will assure the offer of a loan. 
Borrower vs. Lender Valuation of Collateral -- The value of 
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collateral to a borrower differs from its value to a lender. 
This can be true for physical, intangible, and non-traded 
collateral assets. For example, a manufacturing plant is worth 
more to the manufacturer than to a bank; the bank could only sell 
the structure at a mark-down reflecting the costs of converting 
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the structure into a facility for another business. 
Credit can be unduly rationed if the lender under-estimates 
the value placed on collateral by the borrower. Suppose, for 
example, a lender wrongly perceives that a business owner values 
the firm's collateral at $150,000, while the owner actually 
places a $250,000 value on it {perhaps this is the cost to the 
firm of replacing the asset). As a result the lender will 
underestimate the firm's determination to avoid losing this 
collateral through default. Because of the error, a good-risk 
loan can be denied. 
The discovery by lenders of a borrower's actual valuation of 
collateral is especially problematic in the case of a credit-
rating or other non-traded assets. A borrower may value a good 
credit-rating so highly that the probability of default is 
negligible. Yet the lender may not be able to judge this 
commitment and fail to make the loan.{7) The reverse also can 
occur, where a lender believes the promise of a borrower to repay 
the loan no matter what, while the borrower is less committed. 
In the latter case the lender will make loans that are not likely 
to be repaid. 
Differences in Valuation of Collateral Among Borrowers --
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Because lenders do not have full information about how borrowers 
value collateral, approximations are made. Suppose lenders 
estimate that otherwise similar borrowers place the same average 
value on collateral incfuding their credit-ratings. This 
approach can put upward pressure on interest rates and cause some 
low-risk customers to drop out of the market for loans. 
Many small businesses with similar characteristics seek 
loans. Lenders may treat all borrowers as "average" and offer 
each a loan with comparable features, including interest rates. 
However, because otherwise similar borrowers do place different 
values on their credit-ratings, the loan offer will convey 
different information to different businesses. Business owners 
who place more than average value on the firm's credit-rating 
will default less often and view the interest rate as too high. 
These low-risk businesses will be discouraged from borrowing at 
loan terms designed for the "average" firm. Firms that place 
below average value on their credit rating will see the loan 
terms as favorable, given their greater likelihood of default, 
and they will borrow more often. Thus the group of borrowers. can 
become over-populated with firms that are more likely to default, 
causing lenders to raise interest rates, reduce the size of 
loans, and restrict other loan conditions. This further dis-
courages low-risk borrowers.(8) 
Differences of Variance in the Value of Collateral Assets 
credit-rationing can arise from uncertainty about the future. 
The value of collateral is important to the lender in the future 
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at the time of default, while the loan decision is made in the 
present. And the net future value is not actually known; rather 
it must be estimated. Lenders prefer projects with collateral 
value that is more nearly predictable, even though collateral 
with less predictable value sometimes has greater value to the 
borrower. 
Suppose two businesses each offer real estate used in the 
project as collateral for their loan proposals. The two projects 
have the same average expected net value of collateral in the 
future, although the range of possible values for their respec-
tive collateral is different. As between two such loan projects, 
a bank will prefer the project with the smaller variance in 
possible value. If the project defaults, the value of the real 
estate collateral will fall into the lower part of its range of 
possible values. The bank expects to recover more from the 
collateral that varies less, and hence falls less, in value. 
In contrast, the collateral with greater variance sometimes 
is better collateral. When a project is successful so that 
collateral value rises to the upper range of probable values, 
borrowers repay the loan and keep the collateral. Borrowers will 
prefer the project with greater variance if the greater expected 
value of collateral given success exceeds the greater loss given 
default. But lenders will always prefer a project with more 
predictable collateral value.(9) A better business proposal with 
wider variation in expected collateral value may not be funded. 
Variations in expected collateral value may particularly 
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affect businesses in non-metropolitan ·areas and possibly tend to 
deter some firms from locating in non-metropolitan rather than 
metropolitan areas. For example, suppose a manufacturing firm 
can locate in a high-wage, high land rent urban area or a lower-
wage, lower land rent non-metropolitan area. On average, the 
collateral value of the facility is the same in both areas. If 
the venture fails, the salvage value is lower in the non-
metropolitan location because there are fewer alternative uses 
for the plant. A lender will prefer the urban location. In the 
event of success, however, the plant may be worth more in the 
non-metropolitan area because lower land values, wages, and other 
factor costs shift more of the earnings into the return at-
tributable to the facility. The non-metropolitan location could 
yield greater net benefit from the project, even though it might 
not be funded at this location. 
As described in section II, either screening or the use of 
collateral can lead to credit rationing. However, credit-
rationing supposes that a borrower is restricted by many lenders, 
not just one or a few. Otherwise the borrower, when refused by 
one bank, can simply apply to another. For this reason, the 
structure of the credit market and the ease with which borrowers 
can select among possible lenders has an important bearing on the 
availability of credit to small business. 
III. Characteristics of Lenders and the Market for Credit 
The ability of a small business to obtain credit is restric-
ted by the size and location of banks. A small business typical-
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ly deposits at a bank located in its general neighborhood and may 
be confined to borrowing in the same market area. (10) For some 
businesses, especially in non-metropolitan areas, available local 
lenders are small, independent banks with little experience in 
commercial lending or complex loan arrangements; businesses in 
other locations have neighborhood access to larger banks. The 
cost and availability of credit for small business may be 
influenced by the characteristics of local banks and the con~ 
centration of local banking markets. 
Local Banks 
For some small independent banks, opportunities to make 
commercial loans come infrequently. And loan officers accus-
tomed, for example, to making agricultural and consumer loans, 
may have relatively little expertise in handling commercial 
credit. Business loans, therefore, can be costly and inherently 
risky for these banks. (11) Consequently, some small banks may 
use relatively conservative standards in evaluating and granting 
such loans. (12) 
In contrast, larger banks review many business applications 
and some banks have specialized departments dealing with the 
business proposals of specific industries. These banks have more 
expertise in making the loan transaction. However, they tend to 
be located in major metropolitan areas. 
Suppose that a small business applies for credit at an 
independent bank in a small city. Assuming that comparable 
proposals are funded elsewhere for similar firms, is it possible 
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that the applicant can be turned down both at the local bank and 
at a larger, commercial lending institution located in a major 
metropolitan area? The previous section argues that this can 
happen for reasons related to screening and collateral require-
ments. This section argues that turn-down also could happen for 
reasons related to bank size and location. 
Small Independent Banks Small banks lend less of their 
total funds than larger banks. A larger percentage of the 
commercial loans they make, however, is devoted to local busi-
ness. Banks with less than $50 million in assets comprise about 
64 percent of all banks and have only about 9 percent of all bank 
assets. These banks lend on average about 12.2 percent of their 
funds as commercial loans, with 95 percent of that going to local 
businesses. They also make some personal loans to business 
owners where the funds are used for business purposes. Larger 
banks lend 16.9 percent or more directly to business, with 80 
percent or less of that going to local firms.(13) 
The absence of risk spreading by lenders, especially small 
banks, can result in rationing of business credit. Because a 
small bank has relatively few assets, it may not be able to meet 
comparatively large business credit requirements. A loan of 
$200,000, for example, can exceed a small bank's lending limit or 
may be too large for the bank voluntarily to risk undertaking 
alone. Spreading the loan among several co-operating banks will 
avoid legal lending limitations and spread risk. If risk 
spreading does not occur, then "investors in the enterprise will 
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not be able to diversify away all 'non-systematic' risk. It will 
therefore either have to produce an inefficiently high return to 
compensate for this additional risk, or be denied capital 
altogether." (14) 
In markets with only a few, small banks, risk spreading 
among the local banks may not be possible. Further, if the local 
economy is considered risky, then a co-operative loan also can be 
perceived as risky by outside financial institutions. The local 
banks themselves may not look like good risks as co-operative 
partners, even if the project seems sound. Local banks may not 
have easy access to national money markets.(15) 
In one survey of non-metropolitan banks in Wisconsin, 40 
percent are found to have made no complex loans at all--i.e., no 
guaranteed loans, no loans over the bank's allowable lending 
limit, and no loans sold to other banks. In fact a large portion 
of business lending activity was accounted for by a few banks, 
with 12 of 192 survey respondents providing 22 percent of total 
business loan volume.(16) 
All banks, including the small independents, have choices 
about how to invest their assets and some choices move capital 
out of the local area. Suppose local business investments are 
more costly (due to information requirements) than other options 
or believed to be too risky or that the bank does not participate 
in risk spreading.arrangements. A prudent local banker will 
acquire safer, n~n-local or non-business assets. Small banks, 
generally, have fewer assets in local business loans and more 
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assets in other local investments than larger banks. (17) Other 
options for a small bank include (but are not limited to) lending 
to other banks on the federal funds market, purchases of U.S. 
Government securities or other bonds; extending more consumer and 
housing credit; and offering agricultural loans. Some of these 
involve exporting local funds outside of the immediate banking 
market, a phenomenon referred to as "capital flight." Small 
banks in rural areas tend to be net suppliers of funds for 
investment in other areas. 
Local risk factors are high in non-metropolitan economies 
with little economic diversity. For example, real estate used as 
collateral in a rural area may have little value in the event 
that a business project fails. Some amount of capital flight 
from such areas is appropriate and helps guarantee a good return 
for local savers. Bankers may, however, over-estimate the risk 
of local investments (perhaps due to lack of information about 
the local economy) or under-estimate the risk of outside options. 
Then outside investments can mistakenly take priority over local 
business projects and result in local credit-rationing. If 
outside investments actually are less risky than local ones and 
have a greater expected net return, capital flight does not cause 
credit rationing. 
Larger Commercial Lending Banks -- Even if a small business 
has been turned down for credit at one or more small, local 
banks, it can apply to a major commercial lender. For some 
businesses, this involves banking at a non-local bank. Some 
18 
small business owners go reluctantly to outside lenders, preferr-
ing to stick with their "own" banker who knows their financial 
history and character.(18). Because of these and other costs, a 
business will make a limited number of attempts to find credit 
before giving up the search. 
Many rural businesses have access to large financial 
institutions in their local bank markets. About 40 percent of 
rural counties have a branch or correspondent of a banking 
institution with $500 million or more in assets.(19) Other rural 
businesses, however, do not have this local access. Will the 
project of a credit-worthy small business be funded by a major 
commercial lender in another market area? While the answer can 
be yes, there also are several reasons why credit could be 
denied. These have to do with 1) transactions costs, 2) the 
customer relationship, and 3) secondary benefits. 
1) Screening of applicants to reduce transactions costs, as 
discussed above, could exclude the small business proposal. 
Also, transactions costs could interfere if the bank knows little 
about the economy of the area where the business project is 
located. With little information, the bank can decide that this 
loan is riskier than other projects requesting funding. Or the 
proposal may simply be more costly to evaluate because more 
information is needed. 
2) The small business could be ruled out because it is not a 
regular customer and will use few of the other services of the 
bank. For large banks, costs are reduced when customers use many 
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services of the bank as compared to the cost of providing.each 
service piecemeal. (20) Therefore the bank may be better off it 
services regular customers that use many banking services before 
it services other businesses. 
3) Finally, the non-local bank is not likely to get many 
benefits from economic improvement in the neighborhood of a 
growing, small business. In some communities, economic decline 
leaves local retail and service firms with excess capacity. If 
another local business starts or grows as a result of a bank 
loan, these firms will get benefits in the form of greater 
business activity and income. Even local banks may benefit from 
the windfall increase in overall local economic activity. In a 
declining area, grow~h of a small business may bring widespread 
benefits.(21) However, banking benefits from a boom in customer 
activity will go only to local banks with excess capacity. Even 
if a project leads to local recovery from an earlier decline, a 
non-local bank has no extra incentive to provide funding for this 
project because it does not capture the local economic rents. 
Thus the size and location of banks possibly influences the 
availability of credit to a small business. A business with a 
credit-worthy proposal could be turned-down by one or more small 
banks in its own neighborhood for one set of reasons and turned-
down by larger banks in another area for a different reasons. 
Market Concentration 
For many small businesses, the available market area for 
loans is concentrated; that is, relatively few lenders provide a 
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relatively large share of all the business loans in that area. 
When a market area is concentrated, then some banks could improve 
their profit earnings by rationing loans and raising interest 
rates. However, concentration does not mean that lenders do 
exercise market power, only that such an action is possible. If 
lenders do exercise market power, then less is lent and interest 
charges are higher than in a comparable unconcentrated market. 
Banking activity is concentrated in many rural counties and 
bank market areas. For example, in Minnesota virtually all of 
the 42 sub-state markets for business lending are either moderat-
ely or highly concentrated. According to a standard measure of 
market concentration,(22) 28 of th~ market areas for business 
loans are highly concentrated. Thirteen market areas including 
the Twin Cities area are moderately concentrated. Only one 
market area is unconcentrated.(23) 
Banks in more concentrated market areas have better profit 
rates according to economic studies.(24) This evidence poses a 
chicken and egg problem--which came first, the larger profit or 
the greater concentration? If a bank is unusually efficient and 
well managed, it may make more loans and earn more profits than 
other banks in the market area. And the level of market con-
centration will rise. Conversely, if a market is concentrated, 
then the number of active lenders is small. Local borrowers have 
relatively few lenders to go to and a lender potentially can 
benefit from lending less and charging more. When the market is 
more competitive due to a large number of lenders, borrowers have 
I 
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more options and credit rationing is not likely to occur. 
Some states permit branch banking in an effort to encourage 
competition in local bank markets and to reduce the potential for 
credit restrictions arising from concentration. "Branch banking" 
means that large banks can open full service, branch offices at 
locations other than the site of the home-office. In a branch-
banking state, even a seemingly small local bank may actually be 
an office of a major bank. In non-branch banking states, the 
independently-owned local banks--called unit banks--may not be 
linked to major financial institutions. Some analysts believe 
that banks compete more vigorously in markets where branching is 
allowed. Even if a branch.bank is not already in the market, the 
potential entry by a· branch always exists. Potential competition 
discourages existing banks from rationing credit to earn excess 
profit. (25) 
Small banks, in general, are seen as "a conduit through 
which a significant portion of funds leaves local communities--
particularly the small, rural communities where small banks 
predominate." (26) For small banks that are closely integrated 
with larger ones, this outflow of funds is more likely to happen. 
As a result, local savers in rural areas get higher interest 
rates than is possible in the local market. "However, other 
individuals and very small businesses, no longer the sole 
commercial focus of these banks, may be hurt." (27) Also, the 
larger (parent) bank may make more home-office loans to busi-
nesses located in the rural markets of a branch bank. Unfor-
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tunately, no data are available to test the extent to which 
savings return through such main office lending. 
The pattern of lending within nonmetropolitan areas may 
differ for branch and non-branch states. States with branch 
banking may have more business lending in rapidly growing rural 
areas and less in slow-growth areas. A credit-worthy borrower 
in a booming rural area could have more trouble getting credit in 
a non-branching state; if located in a declining area, credit 
could be somewhat more scarce in a branch banking state. Three 
principal differences between branch and non-branch bank lending 
behavior are found in a study of Colorado (a non-branch or unit 
bank state) and Arizona (a branch banking state). 1) Branch 
banks make proportionately more loans than unit banks, so that a 
larger percentage of deposits potentially is available for local 
credit. 2) Both branch and unit banking states show a transfer 
of funds from rural savers to urban borrowers, so that not all 
rural deposits are lent locally. However, 3) branch banking 
appears to put more credit into rapidly growing rural areas, and 
less into slow growth areas, than unit banking. Thus, "the net 
effect of branch banking on the reallocation of loanable funds 
appears to be primarily intrarural and rural-to-urban." (28) 
A small business potentially faces barriers to credit 
because of the market structure of the banking industry and the 
location of potential lenders. Section IV adds to the list of 
possible credit constraints by identifying external benefits, the 
unpaid-for benefits to secondary parties that can result 
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from a new project. The inability to capture revenue from 
externalities can restrict the available business credit. 
rv. External Benefits from the Loan Project 
The term "externality" refers to the divergence between 
revenue received by the business and the net value of all 
benefits or costs received by society from a project. Business 
projects with external benefits will be under-funded by private 
lenders, such as when historic renovation of one property 
improves neighboring property values. And projects with external 
costs will be over-funded, as when smokestack emissions reduce 
the value of neighboring properties. Certain characteristics 
common to non-metro~olitan areas are associated with external 
benefits, for example access to natural recreation opportunities 
or excess capacity in some retail and personal service firms. 
When a business project in a non-metropolitan area provides 
external benefits, the project is likely to be underfunded by 
private lenders. 
A bank's decision about a loan application depends partly on 
the expected revenue from the project. A project that improves a 
lakeside resort, for example, generates revenue through higher 
occupancy and higher room prices. This revenue is available to 
repay the loan. However, the project also may provide indirect 
benefits to other parties. These benefits are free, even though 
the secondary parties would be willing to pay for them if a 
process for payment were readily available. As a result of the 
improvement project, visitors to the resort area enjoy a better 
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view or improved access to a lake or forest, without renting a 
room at the resort. Society gets total benefits from the project 
that exceed the revenue stream. The bank, rightly acting in its 
own self interest, may deny the loan because the revenue stream 
is too small. But society, taking all benefits into account, 
would be better off if the project were funded. Projects located 
in both metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas can provide 
external benefits. 
This section concentrates on projects with external benefi-
ts; those projects that are likely to get too little funding from 
ordinary credit sources. Two cases of external benefits are 
discussed, those related to public goods and those arising from 
the local costs of economic cycles. 
Public Goods 
Non-metropolitan areas are the location for certain business 
activities, such as those related to fishing and skiing, that 
provide public-good benefits. For most goods, such as an 
automobile tire or a toothbrush, use of the good is limited to 
customers who pay for it. In the case of "public goods" it is 
not possible to exclude non-paying customers. Examples of nearly 
pure public goods are ilean air, national defense, and radio 
signals--if these goods are provided for one paying customer they 
also are provided to many others for free. Other goods are 
partially but not wholly public goods. For example, a ski resort 
area may be used for hiking, bird watching, and other purposes by 
non-customers. 
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In the case of substantial external benefits, producer 
revenue is an unusually small share of the actual benefits that 
accrue from the project. Private banks are likely to deny 
funding. In some cases, governments or private donors decide to 
produce or subsidize the goods to ensure that the public benefit 
is received. This is one important reason for public education, 
public transportation, public sanitation, and for philanthropic 
efforts, such as support for the arts or medical care for 
disaster victims. 
Other goods and services have public good qualities but do 
not receive support from either the public sector or charitable 
organizations. Projects such as the renovation of an old fishing 
or skiing resort can yield external benefits but receive no 
external support. If the expected benefit stream to non-paying 
customers is large enough, the project is desirable even though 
banks will not fund it. 
Economic Decline 
Local economies go through periods of decline followed by 
restructuring of the local economic base as a result of national 
and worldwide shifts in economic activity among different 
industries. In general, the trends cannot be managed by inflows 
of capital to local economies; not even substantial amounts of 
new money can counteract the major forces of the economy. 
Demand, factor costs, transportation, technological changes, 
international competition, weather, and other forces are suffi~ 
ciently powerful to swamp any local injections of credit. 
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An undiversified nonmetropolitan economy is dependent on one 
or a few industries. When activity declines in one of these 
industries few jobs are available for displaced workers and the 
collateral of a failing business has little or no value in 
alternative uses. Other local businesses bear some of these 
costs directly as demand falls for retail and service goods and 
local excess capacity increases. Some costs are absorbed by 
governments and taxpayers in the form of funding for income 
maintenance and other public assistance programs. And in-
dividuals bear the rest of the costs as retraining, relocation, 
and other personal expenses. 
Economic stabilization is sometimes possible in these areas, 
if new businesses can cushion the decline caused by sector 
shifts. The social benefits accruing to new business include 
both the expected revenue stream to the new business and 
avoidance of the costs of decline for other parties. In 
particular, as employees spend the income resulting from growth 
of one business, this stimulates business activity for other 
local firms otherwise faced with excess capacity and too few 
customers.(29) 
From society's point of view, the new business project is 
justified even if it does not earn enough revenue to cover a 
traditional bank loan. Economic benefits to secondary businesses 
are socially valuable. And avoidance of other community costs 
also makes the project potentially beneficial. Banks, reasonab-
ly, are only interested in the revenue stream accruing directly 
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to the project and loan commitments normally will not be made in 
consideration of other public benefits. A business proposal that 
is beneficial to the whole community may not be funded by private 
lenders. Therefore the community may decide that public assis-
tance to small businesses is an efficient way of managing local, 
external impacts. (30) 
V. Business Credit in Non-metropolitan Areas 
Businesses everywhere face potential barriers to obtaining 
credit. Screening and collateral requirements have no geographi-
cal boundaries. Concentration of lending markets occurs both in 
major metropolitan areas and in other areas. And a business 
whose product has public good properties may have trouble getting 
funding, no matter where the business is located. 
Businesses in non-metropolitan areas, however, potentially 
confront somewhat more barriers than their metropolitan counter-
parts. This is true for several reasons: 
* Non-metropolitan borrowers may do most of their banking 
business with a small,local bank. Some of these banks have 
little or no experience in complex lending agreements and may be 
unable to make business loans that involve such arrangements. 
* Lacking a standing customer relationship with a large, 
urban bank, a non-metropolitan business may have little access to 
credit from major lenders in metropolitan areas. 
* The value of real estate used as collateral in a non-
metropolitan area could be more variable. If the business 
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succeeds, then collateral may be worth more than a comparable 
business in an major urban area. But if the business fails, real 
estate used as collateral may be virtually worthless because 
there are few other uses for the property. 
* Capital flight may be more likely in a less diversified 
economy where investors have little knowledge of the local 
economy. Because of capital flight, local savings are invested 
elsewhere, rather than returned to finance local economic growth. 
If urban or local investors are excessively cautious about 
returning investments to the non-metropolitan area, a local 
business proposal that warrants credit may not be able to get it. 
* Capital flight can be accelerated by the direct and 
indirect costs of local decline. In a declining, undiversified 
economy with excess retail and service capacity, a business 
proposal that does not warrant credit according to private 
lending standards may, nonetheless, have net benefit for the 
local community. 
The private lending market works well, but not perfectly, in 
allocating economic opportunity to those locations where new 
businesses are most likely to succeed. Too little is known, 
however, about the spatial aspects of imperfections in this 
market. The limited empirical and theoretical evidence about the 
spatial distribution of business credit is examined in this 
monograph. That evidence points to some differences in the 
availability of credit in various locations. The issues raised 
here constitute an important research agenda for determining how 
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credit impacts the allocation of economic activity between 
metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. 
Creating the opportunity for growth in local employment 
opportunities and income is an important concern for community 
and regional policymakers in non-metropolitan areas. Programs to 
enhance supplies of business capital have been used as local 
development strategies in most states and by many local govern-
ment entities. Credit supply programs take many forms including 
those that 1) channel pubiic funds to specific businesses, e.g., 
in the form of direct loans or grants of public money, 2) enhance 
private incentives to lend to certain businesses and industries, 
as in government loan guarantee programs for private lenders, and 
3) encourage increases in total lending (private and possibly 
public) through, for example, state and federal re-regulation of 
financial industries or changes in federal monetary policy. The 
third option can extend more credit for all types of activities 
and, consequently, increase the likeliho9d that previously 
credit-rationed businesses will be funded. The first two 
approaches presume that policy makers can identify and fund 
individual businesses that are credit-rationed by private 
lenders. 
Business proposals, unfunded but worthy of financial 
support, are difficult to identify in practice and once a 
proposal is identified, the private sector may be willing to fund 
it. Policies that attempt to target such businesses may not only 
fund these projects but also can end up either supporting 
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marginal businesses or simply replacing private capital with 
public money. In practice, identifying credit-worthy but 
unfunded projects often is difficult. 
The text of this monograph does, however, suggest clues 
about locational characteristics that influence credit-rationing. 
Policymakers might look more carefully at undiversified areas 
that have suffered recent decline and have excess capacity in 
retail and personal services. Similarly, areas that house 
industries offering broad external benefits are candidates. In 
both cases a new business could bring desirable public benefits 
that exceed the revenue stream available to repay a private 
market loan. Further, business credit could be restricted for a 
project in an area with only a few, small banks that are not 
highly integrated into regional financial markets. or a proposed 
project in an area where real estate takes on a broad range in 
possible future value may similarly be restricted. The frequency 
with which such credit problems arise, however, is not known. At 
this moment, targeting of public policy to identified, credit 
restricted businesses remains a difficult task. 
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